SEPHORA AT MARKS & SPENCER:
DISTRIBUTION WIN… OR POSITIONING GAMBLE?
This week, Marks & Spencer and Sephora announced Sephora at M&S: Sephora-run beauty departments inside 100 M&S stores on high streets and in retail parks across the UK, plus M&S.com, starting in spring 2027. This is a distribution win for both brands. It’s also a huge Positioning gamble for both, and co-branding history is remarkably clear about how that gamble usually ends. (Spoiler alert: not well.)
Mark Ritson, whose work I respect a great deal, summed the deal up in a LinkedIn post as “big upside, no downside.”
I agree with the upside. It’s the “no downside” I disagree with, strongly. I said so in a short comment under his LinkedIn post and promised a fuller analysis of where this could break. Here it is.
TL;DR: Two strong brands don’t automatically add up in the consumer’s mind just because they add up on a spreadsheet. And in this particular deal, only one of them can win the position that actually matters.
Both Can Win On Sales. Only One Can Win On Position.
A Distribution Win, and a Massive Positioning Gamble
The mechanics are straightforward. Sephora-branded beauty departments will replace the current M&S beauty areas that sell branded products in 100 UK stores. M&S will keep selling its own-label beauty. A small number of stores with existing beauty departments won’t be part of the initial rollout and will stay focused on own-label. Sephora will staff the departments with its own beauty advisors, and M&S.com will carry a broader range for home delivery or Click & Collect.
To put the 100 in context: M&S has more than 1,000 UK stores, but most of them are food-only. The stores that matter here are its full-line stores, the ones that sell clothing, home and beauty alongside food, and M&S currently has 227 of them, heading toward about 200. So Sephora will take over beauty in roughly half of M&S’s full-line estate. This isn’t a pilot. It’s the core of M&S’s non-food business.
And M&S is starting from a very small base. According to its own announcement, citing WorldPanel by Numerator data, the UK beauty market is worth £5.2 billion and grew just 1.2% in the year to July 2026. M&S held only 1.3% of it over the latest 12 weeks. By simple arithmetic, that’s somewhere around £68 million a year in a £5.2 billion market. And in a market growing barely more than 1% a year, M&S can’t grow beauty by riding the tide. Every pound it gains has to come out of someone else’s till.
Now read what each side said it wants. John Lyttle, who runs fashion, home and beauty at M&S, framed beauty as a category with the potential to bring in new customers and give existing ones reasons to shop more often. The press coverage was blunter: this is M&S’s latest move to attract younger shoppers. Sarah Boyd, Sephora UK’s managing director, framed it as a way to reach customers in the communities where they already live, shop and spend their time.
Put those two statements side by side and the tension is already visible.
M&S wants Sephora to bring new people to M&S. Sephora wants M&S to bring Sephora to people who are already there. Those aren’t the same goal.
One is about where shoppers go. The other is about what shoppers find when they get there. That difference is the whole story.
Distribution Compatibility Isn’t Positioning Compatibility
On paper, this deal reads as close to perfect. M&S has one of the most trusted names on the British high street, a large store estate, a loyalty program in Sparks, and a beauty business that’s badly underpenetrated. By M&S’s own numbers, only about one in seven of its Clothing & Home customers shopped beauty in a given year.
Sephora has what M&S lacks: desirability, the brands younger women actually want (Rhode, Makeup by Mario, Charlotte Tilbury), and a reputation as the place beauty gets discovered. What Sephora lacks in the UK is reach. It has 18 stores and is targeting 20 by the end of 2026.
That’s distribution compatibility, and it’s real. Can the product sit in this store? Does the footfall match? Is there space, staff and a logistics model that works? Every one of those boxes gets ticked here.
Positioning compatibility is a different test entirely. It asks what happens when two brands occupy the same space in the consumer’s mind.
Do their meanings reinforce each other, or does one quietly overwrite the other? The first test is measured in sales per square foot. The second is measured by what a shopper answers when you ask her a very simple question: where do you go for beauty?
Most co-branding failures pass the first test and fail the second. And usually nobody notices, because the first test produces numbers every quarter and the second one doesn’t produce numbers at all, until the markdowns start or the contract ends.
Three Famous Failures, and Why They Actually Failed
The standard post-mortems on failed co-brands blame execution: the product was wrong, the price was wrong, the timing was wrong. Those things were true, but they were symptoms. In each of the three cases I cited in my comment, the root cause was a Positioning problem that no amount of better execution would have (or could have) fixed.
Sears × Kardashian Kollection (2011 to 2015)
What happened
The Kardashian Kollection launched in roughly 400 Sears stores in August 2011. Bruno Schiavi, the designer behind the line, told WWD it could generate $200 million to $300 million in its first year. For context, analysts cited at the time by CBS News estimated Sears sold around $4 billion of apparel a year, so the Kardashians were expected to account for close to 10% of it.
By 2013, the collection was being marked down to bargain-basement prices, with some items reportedly as low as $8 and $9. Sears dropped the line in 2015 amid poor reviews and deep price cuts.
Why it failed
Sears tried to borrow a position it couldn’t host. The Kardashians meant celebrity, glamour and fashion that photographs well. Sears meant Craftsman tools, Kenmore appliances and, as Khloé Kardashian herself admitted, washers and dryers.
Here’s the mechanism that matters. When a borrowed brand appears inside a host brand’s space, the venue becomes the proof. Full stop.
The shopper doesn’t think “Kardashian fashion, conveniently available at Sears.” She thinks “clothes from Sears,” and the host’s meaning discounts the borrowed equity on contact. Meaning flows downhill into the venue, not uphill out of it.
The fans who would pay for Kardashian cachet didn’t go to Sears to find it, and the Sears shopper didn’t come in wanting bodycon dresses. The partnership sat in the gap between two audiences and served neither.
That’s what downside looks like.
Target × Neiman Marcus Holiday Collection (2012)
What happened
Target and Neiman Marcus launched a holiday collection with 24 top American designers and more than 50 products, sold in both retailers at once and promoted with an elaborate (and very expensive) tie-in to the ABC series Revenge. It was billed as the perfect blend of Target’s cheap chic and Neiman’s luxury. Within weeks, Jefferies analyst Daniel Binder called it a flop. Slow sales forced markdowns of up to 70%, and Target’s December sales came in below expectations.
Why it failed
This one is the most important precedent for Sephora and M&S, and it’s usually misread. Most analysts said the merchandise was too expensive for Target shoppers. True, but that’s the symptom. The cause is that the collaboration asked shoppers to accept two contradictory promises simultaneously.
Target’s promise is designer-ish style at Target prices. Neiman’s promise is luxury that’s worth paying for. Put the same product in both stores and each promise cancels the other: too expensive to be a Target bargain, too available to feel like Neiman luxury.
Compare that with Missoni for Target a year earlier, which sold out so fast it crashed Target’s website. The difference wasn’t the designer quality. Missoni was a designer brand that came to Target on Target’s own terms, so there was only one destination in the transaction: Target.
With Neiman Marcus there were two retailers, two destinations and one product, and the shopper had no idea which brand’s rules applied.
That’s exactly the structure of Sephora at M&S because Sephora isn’t a product brand. It’s a retailer, and a destination, placed inside another retailer.
Very risky. Lots of downside. Will it work? Magic 8 Ball says “outlook not so good.”
McDonald’s × Beyond Meat McPlant (2021 to 2022)
What happened
An initial eight-restaurant test in late 2021 sold roughly 70 McPlants per store per day, and McDonald’s expanded the test to about 600 restaurants in the San Francisco Bay Area and Dallas-Fort Worth in February 2022. That’s when it fell apart. BTIG’s analysts reported that even the better-performing stores were selling only about 20 a day against expectations of 40 to 60. Dallas-Fort Worth came in 30% below the low end of projections, around 13 a day, and operators in rural East Texas reported selling only a handful, three to five a day.
In late July 2022, a JPMorgan analyst’s note titled “McPlant Seems McDone in the U.S.” reported the item was gone from the menus he checked, and Beyond Meat’s shares fell about 6%. McDonald’s never rolled it out nationally.
I’d file that under downside.
Why it failed
This is a failure of intent. I use a framework I created called The Intent Behind the Intent™, and it asks a simple question: what is the shopper actually trying to accomplish when she walks through this particular door? Not what she says she wants, but what’s the real underlying motivation.
Nobody drives to McDonald’s to eat less meat. The Beyond Meat buyer’s intent points away from McDonald’s, and the McDonald’s buyer’s intent points straight at a Big Mac. The co-brand was built for a customer who wasn’t in the room.
Two years later, Joe Erlinger, president of McDonald’s USA, said it about as plainly as it can be said: he didn’t think the U.S. consumer was coming to McDonald’s looking for plant-based protein.
The product also contradicted itself.
It came with American cheese and mayonnaise and was cooked on shared equipment, so the strictest plant-based buyers had reason to reject it, too. Two details make this case especially instructive. First, the eight-store test at 70 a day measured curiosity, not position. Trial isn’t preference, and a launch spike tells you almost nothing about what a brand will mean in a year. Second, the McPlant was rolled out nationally in the UK and Ireland in early 2022. Same patty, same partners, different minds. The product wasn’t the problem. The position was. It usually is.
The Shop-in-Shop Record: Landlords and Tenants
Why Can’t Brands Learn From The Past?
Those three are just a few of the dramatic failures. The next three matter even more, because they’re the same model as Sephora at M&S: a specialist beauty retailer running branded shops inside a general retailer.
The failures here are much more instructive.
Sephora inside JCPenney (2006 to 2022)
What happened
When JCPenney announced Sephora shop-in-shops in 2006, the Associated Press described it as a bid to lure young female customers. Penney was trying to shake its image as a dowdy middle-market department store. Sound familiar?
The partnership grew to roughly 650 Penney stores, and for a few years it was genuinely a game-changer for the chain. But Penney filed for bankruptcy in 2020, the two companies fought a legal dispute that year over Sephora’s attempt to exit early, and Sephora announced its move to Kohl’s in December 2020.
The Sephora shops inside Penney began closing in September 2022. Penney’s new CEO, Marc Rosen, told The Wall Street Journal that “Sephora wasn’t working for us,” explaining that shoppers who came in for Sephora weren’t buying anything else in the store.
Why it failed
I’m not going to claim Sephora caused Penney’s bankruptcy. It didn’t. But this is the clearest example of what I call the landlord trap. The shopper’s destination was Sephora. Penney supplied the square footage and the parking lot.
For sixteen years, across hundreds of stores, Penney never became a place people went for beauty, because the beauty position was never Penney’s to begin with. It belonged to the tenant. And when the tenant left, it took the position with it and Penney had to build a beauty business from scratch.
Where I come from, we call that downside.
Sephora at Kohl’s (2021 to Present)
What happened
On sales, Sephora at Kohl’s is one of the great retail success stories of the decade. The shops now operate in about 1,050 of Kohl’s roughly 1,100 stores. Kohl’s beauty sales rose nearly 90% year over year in the second quarter of 2023, and in 2022 Kohl’s said a quarter of the people coming in to visit the Sephora shops were entirely new to Kohl’s. Fitch estimates Sephora now accounts for about 10% of Kohl’s total sales.
And yet Kohl’s reported its 18th straight quarter of declining comparable sales in August 2026. Kohl’s first-quarter sales are down more than 27% since 2019, according to GlobalData. The space given to Sephora cost Kohl’s elsewhere, too: it had to bring fine jewelry back into 200 stores after losing those sales to make room. Then the Sephora shops themselves started declining: down low single digits in the first quarter of 2026, and down another 4% in the second. GlobalData’s Neil Saunders called Sephora the savior of Kohl’s, observed that it was now suffering from the wider malaise at Kohl’s, and noted that when traffic is under pressure, the beauty business can only do so much.
Why it failed
Kohl’s won on beauty sales and lost on position. Beauty grew; what Kohl’s means didn’t change. And the damage runs in both directions. A host that depends on a tenant for its growth story is exposed the moment the tenant slows, and a tenant can’t outrun its landlord’s footfall. That’s the reverse transfer, and it’s the risk almost nobody prices into these deals: the host’s problems become the tenant’s problems.
Funny, that looks an awful lot like downside.
Ulta Beauty at Target (2021 to 2026)
What happened
Ulta Beauty at Target launched in 2021 and reached about 610 Target stores. In August 2025, the two companies announced a mutual decision not to renew, and the partnership ended in August 2026. A Mizuho analyst pointed to Target’s messy in-store operations, theft and understaffing as likely contributors, and Ulta had lost market share in 2024 for the first time.
Target is replacing the shops with its own Target Beauty Studio, with more than 80 prestige brands, 60 of them new to Target, and beauty-specific rewards built into its own Target Circle loyalty program.
Why it failed
Target is one of the best-positioned retailers in America, and it still spent five years renting its beauty authority. Look at how the loyalty worked: shoppers linked their Ulta Beauty Rewards to Target Circle and earned Ulta points on Ulta purchases made inside Target. Every beauty transaction in a Target store taught the shopper a little more about Ulta. Target has now decided it wants that position back and is building beauty rewards into its own program. That’s a host realizing it had rented something it should have owned. And the Mizuho note shows the reverse transfer again: the host’s execution degraded the tenant’s experience.
The Pattern Behind All Six
Here’s how the six cases line up.
| Partnership | What was expected | What happened | Root cause |
| Sears × Kardashian (2011–2015) | $200M to $300M in year one | Deep markdowns; dropped in 2015 FAIL | The venue discounted the borrowed brand |
| Target × Neiman Marcus (2012) | Luxury meets cheap chic | Up to 70% off; called a flop FAIL | Two destinations, contradictory promises |
| McDonald’s × Beyond Meat (2021–2022) | 40 to 60 McPlants per store per day | About 20; some stores 3 to 5; test ended FAIL | Built for a customer who wasn’t in the room |
| Sephora inside JCPenney (2006–2022) | Lure young female customers | Shoppers didn’t buy beyond Sephora; ended FAIL | The landlord trap |
| Sephora at Kohl’s (2021–present) | Traffic and growth for Kohl’s | Beauty up, 18 straight quarters of comp declines FAIL | Sales won, position didn’t move |
| Ulta Beauty at Target (2021–2026) | Prestige beauty authority for Target | Not renewed; Target builds its own FAIL | Rented position, reclaimed |
Strip away the categories and the same three mechanisms show up again and again.
The venue is the proof. When a brand appears inside another brand’s space, the host’s meaning frames everything the shopper experiences. Sears framed the Kardashians. Kohl’s traffic capped Sephora. Target’s operations shaped Ulta.
Intent decides who owns the trip. Whichever brand the shopper names when she explains why she came owns the position. The other brand supplies convenience. At JCPenney, she came for Sephora. At McDonald’s, nobody came for Beyond.
Two destinations can’t share one answer. When both partners are destinations in their own right, they’re competing for the same slot in the consumer’s memory, whether they intend to or not. Neiman and Target competed for it. Ulta and Target competed for it. Target won by taking it back.
And there’s a fourth lesson that sits over all of them: every one of these partnerships looked like a success in some quarter. The McPlant sold 70 a day. At one moment in time. JCPenney called Sephora a game-changer. At one moment in time. Kohl’s beauty sales grew nearly 90%. At one moment in time.
Grading a Positioning bet with a distribution scorecard is what I call Positioning Mispractice, and it’s why these outcomes so often catch smart companies by surprise.
Seems like downside to me, just delivered slowly.
Both brands can win on sales. They can’t both win on position.
Sephora × M&S: The See-Saw
Now, let’s bring all of that back to the deal on the table. Everything turns on one question, and there’s only one answer to it per shopper: where do I go for beauty? There are three ways she can answer, and each produces a very different outcome.
“I’m going to Sephora. It happens to be inside M&S.” Sephora keeps its destination status. M&S gets the traffic but not the position. M&S becomes the landlord. This is JCPenney.
“I’m going to M&S for beauty.” M&S gains a genuine beauty position, the thing it’s been trying to build for years. But now Sephora has become what M&S’s beauty department is called. Sephora becomes a department.
“I’m already at M&S, so I’ll pick up some Sephora.” This is the most likely outcome, and commercially it’s perfectly good. It grows the basket. But it’s distribution, not Positioning. Neither brand’s position moves much, and it’s the outcome that makes M&S’s stated goal, attracting new and younger customers, the hardest to reach.
Said simply, this is a see-saw, not a partnership of equals in the mind.
The outcome that best repositions one brand is the one that most diminishes the other.
Both companies can post beauty growth at the same time. They can’t both own the answer to that question.
It’s worth being clear about how long a reach “I’m going to M&S for beauty” really is. M&S holds 1.3% of UK beauty. Boots, with about 2,200 stores across the UK and Ireland, has claimed more than 40% of the UK’s skin, makeup and premium beauty market. Space NK has been the specialist beauty destination for more than 30 years, and Superdrug, John Lewis and a fast-growing Sephora are all fighting for the same shopper. For M&S to become the answer to that question, it doesn’t just need Sephora’s brands. It needs to displace the retailer that has owned the answer for generations. No shop-in-shop can do that job on its own.
The Risks for M&S
Outsourcing beauty authority. M&S has spent years building beauty. By late 2023 it carried 47 third-party beauty brands, which made up 42% of M&S Beauty sales, and its own Apothecary line had grown into a £20 million brand in two years. Its stated ambition was to become the trusted editor in beauty for its customers. Under this deal, the editor in 100 stores is Sephora. If the shopper credits Sephora for the curation, M&S has handed the authority for its most promising non-food growth category to a tenant owned by LVMH, which has already shown at JCPenney that it will leave when a better landlord comes along.
That’s the downside, right there.
The own-label adjacency problem. M&S will keep selling its own beauty products. Next to Rhode and Makeup by Mario, how does Apothecary read? There’s a real risk that the host’s own brand starts to look like the value option inside its own store.
A two-tier estate. Some M&S stores will have Sephora, and a few will keep their own-label-focused beauty departments. What does “M&S beauty” mean nationally when the answer depends on which store you walk into?
Cross-shopping is a big and risky assumption, not a given. The whole growth case rests on the younger woman who comes in for Sephora wandering into clothing, home and food. Kohl’s shows some of that can happen. JCPenney shows it may not, and that it can take years to find out.
Loyalty will decide who owns the relationship. Sephora runs its own UK loyalty program. M&S has Sparks. The details haven’t been made public, but if I were on either side, this is the clause I’d read first. Target and Ulta already showed what happens when one partner’s rewards accumulate inside the other partner’s store.
The Risks for Sephora
Destination to department. This is the arithmetic that should worry Sephora most. It has 18 UK stores. This deal adds 100 M&S locations, roughly five times its own footprint. For a large share of British shoppers outside the major cities, their first and possibly only physical Sephora will be a department inside M&S. That’s where Sephora’s meaning in the UK will actually get formed and will persist for decades to come.
Call it what you like, but that reads as downside.
Sephora knows how fragile that meaning is. It opened in the UK in 2000, closed its last stores in 2005, and spent 18 years away before coming back in 2023. It rebuilt carefully, as a destination, with large stores in places like Westfield that drew crowds on opening day. Handing the majority of its physical touchpoints to a host environment is a much bigger bet than the announcement makes it sound.
The reverse transfer. The whole premise of the deal is that Sephora will make M&S feel younger. It could just as easily make Sephora feel older. The coverage of this deal described Sephora as a Gen Z beauty mecca and noted its youngest fans have been nicknamed “Sephora kids.” Put that brand next to the socks and the prawn sandwiches and the associations can flow in the wrong direction. Sephora becomes a little more sensible, a little more practical, a little more like the place your mum shops.
That sounds like downside to me.
The host’s malaise. M&S Food is growing strongly, but its non-food business has been struggling to recover from the 2025 cyber-attack. Kohl’s is the warning here. A tenant can’t outrun its landlord’s traffic, and Sephora’s own UK growth numbers will increasingly depend on M&S footfall it doesn’t control.
What Would Make It Work
None of this means the deal is 100% doomed. It means the upside is real and the downside is being ignored. If I were advising either company, here’s what I’d insist on.
Decide which outcome you’re actually buying, and say it out loud internally. If M&S wants traffic and frequency, it should accept the landlord role knowingly and price the deal accordingly. If it wants a beauty position, Sephora can’t be the whole answer, and M&S’s own-label beauty has to be positioned as a peer inside the department, not a fallback.
Sephora has to keep its own stores unmistakably the real thing. The M&S units should read as convenient outposts of Sephora, not as Sephora itself. That means continued investment in the flagships and a visible hierarchy between them.
Measure position, not just sales. Track which brand shoppers name as their first choice for beauty, especially among women under 35. Track whether Sephora-first shoppers buy anything else in M&S, the exact metric that exposed the JCPenney partnership. And track which associations are moving, and in which direction.
Settle loyalty deliberately. Whoever captures the purchase data and rewards the shopper owns the relationship. That shouldn’t be left to whatever the systems integration makes easiest.
Protect the experience. Sephora’s model depends on self-service, testers, stock and knowledgeable advisors. Target and Ulta showed what happens when the host’s operations let that slip.
So, Big Upside, No Downside? Nope.
The upside is genuine. Can’t be missed, and it is indeed very tempting for both parties. M&S has an underpenetrated beauty business and a customer base that mostly doesn’t shop the category. Sephora needs reach in a market it’s still rebuilding. I’d expect this deal to deliver beauty sales growth for both, probably quickly.
But the downside was never going to show up in the 2027 profit and loss statement. It shows up in the consumer’s mind, where it compounds quietly. The JCPenney partnership looked good for years. Kohl’s beauty numbers still look good. The bill arrives when the contract ends and one brand walks away holding the position, and the other realizes it never owned it.
That’s a lot of downside for a “no downside” deal.
Marty’s Take-Away
Co-branding is an exchange of associations, and it’s negotiated between two companies. But the consumer never signs that contract, and she’s the only party whose signature counts. Sephora at M&S makes excellent commercial sense, and I hope it works. But there’s only one answer to “where do I go for beauty,” and after this deal one of these brands will own it and the other will be renting space around it. The brands decide which associations they want to exchange, but the consumer decides which ones actually transfer. That’s why the downside risks here are enormous, and why they won’t show up where anyone is looking until it’s too late to do much about them.
Selected Sources
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Retail Dive, “Kohl’s disappointed by sales decline in second quarter,” August 29, 2024. https://www.retaildive.com/news/kohls-disappointed-sales-decline-second-quarter-earnings/725505/
Kohl’s Corporation, Q2 2023 earnings call (via MarketBeat). https://www.marketbeat.com/earnings/reports/2023-8-23-kohls-co-stock
Kohl’s Corporation, Form DEFA14A, 2022. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/885639/000119312522078476/d324625ddefa14a.htm
Target Corporation, “Ulta Beauty and Target Announce Plans to Conclude Partnership in 2026,” August 14, 2025. https://corporate.target.com/press/release/2025/08/ulta-beauty-and-target-announce-plans-to-conclude-partnership-in-2026
Retail Dive, “Target, Ulta to end partnership,” August 14, 2025. https://www.retaildive.com/news/target-ulta-shops-partnership-end-breakup/757669/
TheStreet, “Ulta Beauty has left Target, here’s what’s replacing it,” August 20, 2026. https://www.thestreet.com/retail/ulta-beauty-is-leaving-target-heres-whats-replacing-it
NBC Chicago, “‘Reimagined’: Ulta Beauty is leaving Target stores this summer,” June 30, 2026. https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/business/reimagined-ulta-beauty-is-leaving-target-stores-this-summer-heres-whats-replacing-it/3955274/
The Moodie Davitt Report, “Beauty specialist Sephora set to exit UK market,” April 4, 2005. https://moodiedavittreport.com/?p=342834
BeautyMatter, “Sephora Continues UK Rollout with Second London Store,” July 7, 2023. https://beautymatter.com/articles/sephora-continues-uk-rollout
Marty Marion | Master Positioning LLC, Advanced Brand Positioning and The De-Positioning Matrix®, 2026 https://masterpositioning.com
