BLUE OCEANS ARE WHERE BRANDS DROWN

A drowning person's hand raised above the ocean, illustrating why blue oceans are where brands drown

In this Master Positioning take-down, Marty Marion dismantles the most celebrated strategy of the last twenty years: the comfortable fiction that brands win by fleeing competition for a Blue Ocean where no one else swims. They don’t, they mostly drown, and the confident strategists still selling the dream are quietly handing you the single most expensive instruction in marketing.

The famous Blue Ocean “victories” everyone cites were never Blue Oceans at all, just Red Ocean De-Positioning plays mislabeled after the fact, while the genuine new-market bets failed at a staggering 47 percent. Read this before you abandon a market already full of money to go dig a pond nobody asked you to fill.

by Marty Marion

Like Moths To A Flame

The most celebrated strategy of the last twenty years instructs you to walk away from the one thing worth fighting for.

Don’t do it.

I’ll give the orthodoxy its full due before I take it apart, because a takedown that misrepresents its target is just a tantrum with footnotes, and I have no interest in winning an argument against a strawman.

In 2005, W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne published Blue Ocean Strategy, building on a paper they’d run in MIT Sloan Management Review back in 1997, and they handed the business world a metaphor so clean it required almost no thinking to repeat, which is exactly why it traveled so far so fast.

‘Red Oceans’, they said, are the existing markets, the bloodied waters where competitors tear one another apart over the same shrinking pool of demand, driving margins toward zero in a war nobody ultimately wins.

‘Blue Oceans’ are the wide-open, uncontested waters you create for yourself, where, in the phrase that became their whole brand, you make the competition irrelevant. Stop fighting, go somewhere nobody else is, build the pond and own it. Then, because you’re the only brand in the pond on day one, go and grow it.

Sounds logical, no? And like moths to a flame…

Underneath the metaphor sits a genuine and not unserious idea, the one they call the reconstructionist view of strategy. The opposing structuralist view, associated above all with Michael Porter, holds that industry structure is largely a given, that the five forces of any industry, the bargaining power of buyers and of suppliers, the threat of new entrants and of substitutes, and the intensity of rivalry, set hard limits on how profitable anyone inside that industry can ever be.

Kim and Mauborgne pushed back against that fatalism. Market boundaries, they argued, are not fixed at all; they live only in the minds of managers who accept them, and a sufficiently imaginative firm can redraw those boundaries through strategic will and conjure demand that didn’t previously exist.

They built tools to operationalize it: the Strategy Canvas, which plots how every competitor in an industry invests along the same tired set of competing factors, and the Four Actions Framework, the famous Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create grid, which asks which of those factors to kill, which to dial down, which to amplify, and which brand-new ones to invent.

It’s tidy, it’s teachable, and it spread through MBA programs and boardrooms with the velocity of anything that flatters the listener into believing the hardest problem in competitive commerce has an elegant exit.

It’s also, for most of the brands that take it literally, a beautifully argued instruction to commit slow commercial suicide, and I’m going to spend the rest of this piece proving that with the strategy’s own celebrated case studies and with the only kind of evidence that should count, the kind that survives contact with what actually happened.

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I’ve spent forty years at Madison Avenue’s elite ad agencies and consulting to numerous Fortune 500 brands, building category leaders and dismantling the positions of the brands that stood in their way, and the single most expensive sentence a marketer can ever be handed is the one that tells them to leave the fight instead of changing it.

Blue Ocean hands them exactly that sentence, wrapped in the silk of liberation, and what it conspicuously never hands them is the invoice for those calm blue waters, or the survival statistics for the people who set sail in search of them, which are dismal to say the least.

Blue Oceans are where brands drown.

The Number Nobody Quotes When They Quote Blue Ocean

The evidence is where this argument is won and lost, not in metaphor, so we start there.

In 1993, Peter Golder and Gerard Tellis published a study in the Journal of Marketing Research with a title that ought to be tattooed on the inside of every founder’s eyelids: “Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing Legend?”

They examined roughly 500 brands across 50 product categories, tracing the actual histories rather than the flattering myths, and what they found takes a wrecking ball to the romance of the so-called ‘first mover.’

Market pioneers, the firms that created genuinely new market spaces, failed at an astounding rate of 47 percent. Early followers, the firms that entered markets the pioneers had already opened, failed at only 8 percent. Even the pioneers who survived held an average market share of only about 10 percent, against 28 percent for the early leaders who came in right behind them. Tellis and Golder later widened the work into their book Will and Vision, and the verdict only hardened: being first to a market is not a structural advantage, it’s a structural liability, a position the disciplined second mover is delighted to let you occupy while they prepare to take everything you built.

Sit inside what that means, because the mechanism is the whole story and almost nobody who quotes Blue Ocean has bothered to look at it. Let’s take a few moment to do just that.

A Blue Ocean is, by its own definition, a market that does not yet exist, which means there’s no demand sitting in it waiting to be served. It’s an empty vessel. You have to manufacture that demand from raw nothing, at your own expense, and the bill for that manufacturing is the hidden cost Blue Ocean never prints on the menu. Golder and Tellis named the precise dynamic that bleeds pioneers white: the first mover absorbs the entire cost of educating a market that fast followers then exploit for free.

Think about the sequence of expenditures that demands. You pay to teach a population that a problem they’ve been living with is in fact a problem, which of course they will resist accepting (heuristics). You pay to teach them a new solution now exists. You pay to teach them it belongs in their lives and deserves a recurring line in the household budget. You pay to build the distribution, resolve the regulatory ambiguity, and absorb every design mistake personally, because there’s no predecessor whose errors you could have studied.

Then, at the moment you’ve finished paying that tuition, a better-capitalized competitor walks through the door you just propped open minutes ago, skips the entire bill, ships a sharper or cheaper version, and takes the market you spent yourself building.

On average, Blue Ocean pioneers held leadership for a median of just five years. You drain the swamp, you stock the pond, and someone else shows up with a net.

This is why the education cost is not a footnote but the load-bearing column of the whole critique. Everett Rogers spent his career mapping how innovations diffuse through a population, and his adoption curve is brutal at the front end: the innovators and early adopters who’ll try a genuinely new category (not a ‘Category Class‘ evolution) are a thin sliver of any market, while the long, fat middle, the early and late majority where the real money lives, moves slowly, skeptically, and only after the category has been de-risked by someone else’s spending.

Geoffrey Moore later named the deadliest stretch of that curve ‘the chasm’, the gap between the handful of visionaries who’ll buy something brand-new and the pragmatic mainstream who won’t touch it until it’s proven, and the graveyards of business history are packed with pioneers who bled out at the bottom of that chasm without ever reaching the far side.

Blue Ocean sends you cheerfully straight into it. In the language of my own framework, The Positioning Matrix™, the strategy treats every market as though it were permanently locked in the Introductory environment, the single phase of a category’s life in which demand genuinely has to be conjured rather than redirected, in which the brand shoulders the full weight of educating a market about a need it didn’t know it had. I treat that environment as the most capital-hungry and dangerous ground a brand can stand on, a phase to sprint through as fast as money and nerve allow, never a destination. Blue Ocean takes that single most expensive condition in all of marketing and rechristens it the promised land.

A Theory That Only Works In The Rearview Mirror

The deeper rot isn’t only the cost. It’s that Blue Ocean isn’t a theory in any rigorous, falsifiable sense, and the academic community has been saying so, with steadily decreasing politeness, for the better part of two decades. The most damning charge is also the simplest, and once you see it you can’t unsee it: the framework can only ever be validated backwards.

Tassabehji and Isherwood (2014) showed that Blue Ocean suffers from a profound selection bias, because Kim and Mauborgne write almost exclusively about success stories in retrospect, and the framework functions mainly as a lens through which those pre-selected triumphs get reinterpreted after the fact.

Understand what that procedure actually is. You choose the winners first, already knowing they won, then run their victories through the grid, and the grid looks prophetic. But it predicted nothing. It described, in fresh vocabulary, outcomes that had already occurred. That isn’t strategic analysis. It’s astrology with a 2×2, and the horoscope reads as accurate because it’s written after the week is over.

Correlation (you remember this, of course) is not causation.

The structural critiques compound from there, and they come from inside the academy, from disinterested scholars rather than rival consultants with a competing book to sell.

Hilb and Casas (2015) flatly called Blue Ocean a “popular non-scholarly concept.”

Kociatkiewicz and Kostera (2016) faulted it for lacking theoretical coherence, and Aspara and colleagues (2008) for resting on no genuine scientific theoretical corpus at all.

Dixit (2014) dismissed it as a “magic-bullet single solution.”

Mol and colleagues (2017) reduced it further to a bare “single-factor explanation,” exactly the kind of one-size prescription that practitioner-oriented management fashion churns out and discards on a cycle.

Kampa, Cziulik and Amodio (2012) put their finger on the flaw any working marketer feels in their gut the instant they try to deploy the thing inside a real business with real constraints, the absence of any clear link between formulating a Blue Ocean and actually implementing one: Blue Ocean tells you what to do and never how to do it. It names the destination in glowing terms, then abandons you on the question of mechanism, of structure, of the ordered sequence of moves that carries a brand from where it stands to where the framework insists it belongs.

And the jewel in the crown, value innovation, the supposedly revolutionary simultaneous pursuit of lower cost and higher differentiation that’s meant to be the strategy’s beating heart, turns out on inspection not even to be original! Agnihotri (2016) showed that the identical idea had been introduced years earlier under the name “hybrid value.”

Blue Ocean is really just old wine, decanted into a bottle the color of the sea and sold as a discovery. It isn’t. It’s not a discovery, and it’s not even an accurate or effective strategy.

More Than Embarrassing

Here’s why “you can only prove it after it worked” is fatal rather than merely embarrassing.

The marketer who has to decide what to do on Monday morning gains nothing from being told the survivors all swam toward open water. Of course they did. The ones who drowned swimming toward open water aren’t in the book. What they need, the only thing they need, is to know which way to swim before they know whether they’ll survive, and on that one question, the single question that separates a strategy from a souvenir, Blue Ocean has nothing to say.

It hands them courage and a metaphor and sends them into the chasm. And this is where the old structuralist view that Kim and Mauborgne were so eager to bury comes back to collect its debts, because industry structure has an inconvenient habit of being real whether or not your strategy acknowledges it, and a beautifully reconstructed value curve floated on top of a fundamentally brutal industry tends to sink at the waterline. We’re about to watch that happen, with the strategy’s own trophies.

The Autopsies: Four Cases The Seminar Never Finishes Telling You

Here I’ll do the thing the academic critics never quite manage. They stop at “the theory is tautological” and leave the most devastating move sitting right there on the table, so I’ll make it for them. I’m going to take Blue Ocean’s most paraded trophy cases, the exact ones it features on its own website (https://www.blueoceanstrategy.com/) and in its own teaching materials, (https://www.blueoceanstrategy.com/teaching-materials/), and use them to prove two things at once.

First, the cases that genuinely worked were never Blue Oceans at all; they were Red Ocean De-Positioning operations, run inside existing categories that already had customers and demand. Second, the strategy’s own canon is full of cases that didn’t survive contact with industry reality, the very reality the framework had promised they would transcend.

Start with Cirque du Soleil, the example trotted out in essentially every Blue Ocean seminar ever conducted. It’s described, with a straight face, as the poster child of the entire strategy. And here’s the detail the seminar always declines to dwell on:

Cirque Never Left The Circus

The official Blue Ocean canon itself, in its own published case materials, tells you that Cirque reconstructed the industry and reinvented the circus, shifting the buyer group from children to adults and drawing on the sophistication of theater and opera to command a far higher ticket price. One of its earliest productions was titled, in so many words, “We Reinvent the Circus.”

Reinvent, not abandon, not flee, not replace with some invented pond requiring years and fortunes spent educating a public about a need it never knew it had.

Cirque kept the category word. It kept the frame of reference every human being already carried fully formed in their head, the deeply familiar idea of “going to the circus,” and it ruthlessly changed the criteria by which that experience would henceforth be judged. The performing animals, the three rings, the discount seats, the children’s-birthday associations, all of it got reframed in a single stroke as the tired, faintly embarrassing old way, while artistry, narrative, live music, and adult sophistication became the new and elevated standard against which the entire category would now be measured.

That is De-Positioning par excellence, executed with surgical control, and it’s the diametric opposite of what Blue Ocean instructs you to do.

Cirque did not make the competition irrelevant by sailing away from it into uncontested water. It made Ringling Bros. irrelevant by planting itself directly on top of the existing category and raising the rules of evaluation to a height the incumbent’s entire business model structurally could not reach without dismantling everything it was. Ringling couldn’t follow, not because the water was empty, but because following would have meant repudiating its own identity, its own cost structure, its own century of accumulated meaning.

In my framework, The De-Positioning Matrix™, that’s the Displacement Mechanism doing exactly the work it’s engineered to do, in three movements:

There’s the Promise, which the consumer grasps instantly because the category frame already lives in their mind and requires no education.

There’s the Proof, delivered live and undeniable on the stage in front of them.

And there’s the Lock, the differentiation the incumbent cannot copy without indicting and unwinding its own model. Promise, Proof, Lock: that’s how you displace, and displacement is what Cirque actually did.

I’m not going to tiptoe past the fact that Cirque du Soleil filed for bankruptcy protection in June 2020, because the honest version of that story only sharpens my point.

It’s important to read why they filed, because the reason is everything. The Positioning didn’t fail. The Positioning was a triumph that built one of the most recognized names in live entertainment on earth, and the company had been quietly, steadily profitable for decades right up to the end.

What broke it was two things that have nothing whatsoever to do with Blue Oceans or Red Oceans. The first was COVID-19, which over a single week in March 2020 shut down all forty-four of its productions and took its annualized revenue from roughly a billion dollars to zero. The second was its balance sheet: a 2015 leveraged buyout led by the private-equity firm TPG had saddled Cirque with around $900 million in debt and a relentless, debt-funded expansion that left no margin to absorb a shock.A brilliant brand, profitable for years, was felled by a once-in-a-century pandemic landing on top of a private-equity debt load.

It was not undone by any flaw in how it had positioned itself. And the proof is in what came next: the brand was strong enough to be worth rescuing, its backers put fresh capital in, and Cirque was back on its stages by 2021. That is what a sound position looks like even on its worst day. The De-Positioning inside the category Red Ocean worked. The capital structure is what didn’t.

If you’re tempted to wave Cirque off as a fluke of show business, take another example from the official trophy case the Blue Ocean website still proudly displays, and that should, by any honest accounting, have been quietly removed from it years ago.

Curves: A Textbook Blue Ocean Play

Curves, the women’s fitness franchise, is presented in the canon as a textbook Blue Ocean, a brand that reconstructed the boundaries between the traditional health club and the home-exercise program, opened a vast untapped market of women, grew like wildfire once it began franchising, and reached nearly ten thousand clubs serving more than four million members. A genuine triumph… for a while.

Then industry structure, the thing the reconstructionist view assured everyone was merely a failure of imagination, walked in and collected.

Curves peaked at 7,877 US franchise locations in 2005 and then collapsed to roughly 3,523 by 2011, shedding more than half its system, over four thousand clubs, while thousands of once-hopeful franchise owners absorbed severe personal and financial losses.

In 2020 the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the contraction continued, with more than a thousand locations vanishing in a single recent year against a handful of openings. The management professor Michael Roberto wrote the autopsy at the time, and his diagnosis is the whole argument in miniature: the fundamentally unattractive structure of the fitness industry, the very kind of structure Porter’s five forces is built to expose, simply overwhelmed the so-called Blue Ocean aspects of the Curves strategy. He reached for the old Warren Buffett line, and it slams the door shut like a closing argument: when a manager with a reputation for brilliance takes on a business with a reputation for terrible economics, it’s usually the reputation of the business that survives intact.

Blue Ocean told Curves the boundaries were imaginary. The boundaries disagreed.

The third case is the one I find most quietly damning, because it shows the fast-follower massacre Golder and Tellis described unfolding in real time, on a trophy the strategy still celebrates.

Yellow Tail, the Australian wine from Casella, is held up everywhere in the canon as the brand that created a Blue Ocean in the US wine industry, became the number one imported wine, and grew into the fastest-rising brand in the history of both the Australian and American wine trades, hitting twenty-five million cases of cumulative sales by the end of 2005.

But look closely at what Casella actually did, because it’s De-Positioning again in a different costume. Rather than offering wine as wine, Casella deliberately refused to compete with the French, Italian, and premium Californian bottles on the category’s established criteria, the prestige, the complexity, the aging, the intimidating vineyard mystique, and instead recast wine as a fun, approachable, unpretentious social drink, easy to choose and easy to swallow.

It stayed inside the category called wine, kept the word on the label, kept the existing demand, and changed the axis of evaluation from connoisseurship to accessibility.

That’s not a new ocean. That’s the precise De-Positioning of an incumbent set – inside the existing Red Ocean – whose greatest asset, their sophistication, got reframed overnight as their greatest liability, their snobbery.

Then watch what the supposedly uncontested blue water did, exactly as the pioneer-disadvantage research predicts it must. The moment Yellow Tail proved the appetite existed, the followers arrived to feed for free on the demand Casella had paid to create.

The wine trade’s own observers documented it bluntly: the Blue Ocean of easy, fun, semi-wine was rapidly populated by competing predator species, the Two Buck Chucks and the dozens of copycat “critter wine” brands, until the Blue Ocean was turning pink with its own blood. The pioneer educated the market; the settlers ate it. And twenty years on, the trophy itself is faltering under the weight of the cheap, undifferentiated, easily imitated position it pioneered. Casella has posted its first loss in thirteen years, around $5.5 million, with US sales, once the engine of the whole enterprise, falling by nearly 17 percent, and the company in breach of its debt covenants before securing a waiver from its bankers.A position built on being cheap and cheerful and first is a position with no Lock, and a position with no Lock is a position the next predator simply takes.

So three of the four most celebrated Blue Ocean trophies, examined without the flattering soundtrack, tell the same story: the ones that worked were De-Positioning plays inside existing categories that got mislabeled as new-market creation, and the “uncontested” waters they supposedly discovered turned out to be contested, structurally brutal, and, in Curves’ case, terminal.

Water In A Can, And The Oldest Category On Earth

I’ll close the case file with a current one, from consumer packaged goods, in the single most established category that has ever existed, because it removes the last possible escape hatch from the argument.

There is no older nor more competitive category than water. You cannot, by any definition the English language permits, “create a new market space” for water, because human beings have been drinking it since before they could speak, and no amount of strategic imagination is going to persuade anyone that thirst is a need they hadn’t previously noticed.

And yet Liquid Death, founded by Mike Cessario and selling, let’s be honest about what’s in the can, mountain water in an aluminum tallboy, is paraded everywhere as a rule-breaking disruptor that summoned something out of nothing.

By 2024 the brand carried a $1.4 billion valuation and generated $333 million in annual revenue, distributed across more than 130,000 retail locations. A genuinely staggering result, and not one cent of it came from creating a new category, because the category is the oldest one alive.

Liquid Death did exactly what Cirque did and exactly what Yellow Tail did, in a different aisle, and it did it so nakedly the move can’t be mistaken for anything else. It stayed inside the existing category, the Red Ocean called water, the word printed in plain sight on the front of every single can, and it changed the criteria by which water would be judged.

The incumbents, Aquafina, Dasani, Fiji, the entire Nestlé portfolio, had for decades competed on the identical exhausted vocabulary: pristine mountain streams, minimalist logos, vague wellness gestures, the words “purity” and “hydration” repeated until they meant nothing at all.

Cessario didn’t invent a new beverage and spend a fortune teaching the world it needed one. The need was the most pre-existing one it’s possible to name.

What he did instead was target the brand-conscious consumer who’d never pay extra for plain water but will gladly pay for water that says something about who they are, and he wrenched the evaluation axis off of purity and onto identity, rebellion, humor, and a tallboy can a person actually wants to be seen holding.

The sustainability story, infinitely recyclable aluminum set against the incumbents’ rising tide of discarded plastic, handed that new criterion a hard, defensible, provable edge the bottlers couldn’t easily answer.

Read that move in the cold light of framework and it’s unmistakable. Liquid Death kept the category, kept the entire demand pool, which is to say every thirsty human alive, and it de-positioned the whole incumbent set by recasting their proudest asset, that clean, corporate, wellness-coded respectability, as the very thing that made them soulless, interchangeable, and forgettable.

That’s Category Class Positioning in its most distilled form: the establishment of a new class inside an old category, so that the consumer needs zero re-education about what the product is or why they’d ever want it, and the only message the brand has to land is the single evolutionary advantage that obsoletes the way everybody else does it. It’s Red Ocean warfare, fought and won with a De-Positioning blade, and it minted a unicorn in the most commoditized category on the shelf.

No blue water was harmed in the making of this billion-dollar brand, and the imitators now crowding the canned-water set behind it are, once again, the fast followers arriving to feed on demand somebody else’s Positioning created.

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The Real Choice, The One They Hid From You

Now name the distinction Blue Ocean blurs, the blur that has cost its readers more money than any of them will ever calculate. The choice was never “compete in the Red Ocean” versus “escape to the Blue Ocean.” That framing is a false binary, and false binaries are the chief mechanism by which lazy strategy launders itself into sounding brave.

The real choice, the one that governs whether a brand leads or dies, is between two entirely different things you can do while standing inside the existing category where the demand already lives. You can compete on the criteria the incumbents have already established, which is the bloody, margin-crushing, race-to-the-bottom price war that Kim and Mauborgne are entirely right to warn you away from. Or you can change the criteria themselves, raise the terms on which the category gets evaluated, and turn the incumbents’ accumulated strengths into liabilities the instant the new standard takes hold.

Blue Ocean looks hard at the price war, recoils from it correctly, and then draws the wrong conclusion from a correct observation, which is the most dangerous kind of error because the premise is sound. It concludes: leave. And leaving means forfeiting the demand that already exists, the demand you’d otherwise inherit at no cost, in exchange for self-funding the slow, brutal construction of brand-new demand across the worst stretch of the adoption curve, with the historical record putting your odds of drowning before the followers arrive at roughly one in two.

Category leaders do the inverse, and every framework I’ve spent four decades building is engineered to execute it. They plant themselves exactly where the demand already swims, and they raise the rules of evaluation so completely that the incumbents are left defending a standard the market has stopped caring about.

This is the Positioning Platform doing its work: a Meaningful Benefit the consumer already wants, made real through Provability so the claim has a spine, sharpened by genuine Differentiation, and weaponized through the De-Positioning of everyone who came before. They never have to teach the market what the category is or why it matters, because the market already knows it in its bones. They only have to make searingly clear why the way everyone else still does it is now, suddenly and permanently, the obsolete way.

This is the lineage Blue Ocean conveniently forgets it descends from.

Al Ries and Jack Trout, the latter of whom I was fortunate to learn from directly, established decades earlier in Positioning and then in The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing that the human mind has almost no shelf space for genuinely new categories, that it resists and resents being asked to file a wholly novel concept, and that the durable way to win is not to invent a category the mind has no slot for but to seize and redefine the frame of reference already installed there.

Their Law of the Mind holds that it’s better to be first in the mind than first in the marketplace, and even their Law of the Category, read correctly, is about re-dividing mental territory the prospect already holds, the ‘minicomputer’ carved out of computing, the ‘discount broker’ carved out of broking, not colonizing empty space.

Blue Ocean inverts that hard-won wisdom and tells you the empty space is the prize, when empty space is the most expensive and least defensible ground in all of marketing, because empty space has no demand in it and no walls around it. And the reward for doing it the right way, for redefining and then leading an existing category rather than fleeing to an invented one, is not a sliver of some pond you dug with your own bankroll. It’s the lion’s share of a market already full of money, a relationship the long-running PIMS research program of Buzzell and Gale tied directly and durably to profitability across decades of data.

Market leadership in a real category pays. Pioneering an imaginary one mostly bankrupts.

Homage, And Then The Burial

I’ll restate the pro-Blue Ocean argument one last time, fully and in good faith, in its strongest, most charitable, and most convincing version before putting it down because an argument that ducks its opponent’s best rejoinder hasn’t won anything.

Kim and Mauborgne would protest that they never told you to abandon the customer’s underlying need, only to reconstruct the boundaries of the market around it. Granted.

But reconstructing the boundaries inside an existing category, keeping the frame the consumer already holds while changing the criteria of evaluation, is not the discovery of a Blue Ocean by any honest use of their own language. It’s De-Positioning. It’s the exact move their four best cases actually ran, Cirque and Curves and Yellow Tail and, in living color, Liquid Death, which means their own trophies are testimony for my case and against theirs.

They’d protest, second, that Red Oceans are bloody and fighting in them is value destruction, so why not leave. Because the blood is in price competition specifically, not in competition as such, and raising the criteria ends the price war without forfeiting the demand pool. You get the bloodless victory while still standing in the Red Ocean, which is the best of both, and the very thing the false binary was built to hide from you. They’d protest, third, that the Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create grid is a method, a real procedure.

It isn’t. It’s a description of the shape of outcomes that already succeeded, which is exactly why the working marketer keeps discovering, the hard way, that it tells them what the answer looked like in hindsight and never how to produce one going forward.

Blue Ocean Strategy Is The Most Expensive Piece Of Conventional Wisdom That Doesn’t Work Of The Last Twenty Years

This is a Positioning Mispractice in its purest systemic form, the kind that propagates through the profession not because it’s true but because it’s repeatable, teachable, and flattering, the three traits that let a bad idea outlive every disconfirming case study filed against it.

It taught a whole generation of marketers to run from competition instead of redefining it, to mistake the most capital-intensive and least defensible condition in all of commerce for a sanctuary, and to dignify the act of fleeing the fight with the name of strategy.

It took the structuralist insight that industry economics are real and brutal, an insight Curves and Yellow Tail both died proving, and talked an entire field into believing that insight was merely a failure of nerve. On the evidence of its own trophies, half of them mislabeled and a meaningful share of them in or near bankruptcy, it is one of the costliest pieces of conventional wisdom the discipline has swallowed in two decades.

The category leaders never believed a word of it. They were never out hunting for an empty ocean, because they understood that an empty ocean is empty for a reason, that the absence of competitors is usually the presence of no demand. They stood in the crowded, bloody, money-filled water they already occupied, changed the rules of evaluation so thoroughly that the incumbents around them woke up obsolete, and took the whole of what was already swimming there.

That’s not a Blue Ocean. That’s a Red Ocean conquered by the only force that has ever actually conquered one: a brand that changed what the category was allowed to mean.

Marty’s Take-Away

Blue Ocean is not a strategy for creating markets. It’s a strategy for paying, out of your own pocket, to discover whether one exists, with a 47 percent chance the answer is ‘no’ and a fast follower waiting to inherit the market if the answer is ‘yes’.

The winners everyone cites as proof never actually left their category; they stood inside it and de-positioned the incumbents by changing the criteria of judgment, which is the precise opposite of sailing off to empty water.

So stop looking for an ocean with nobody in it. Find the crowded one already full of money, change the rules by which it’s judged, obsolete the incumbents on a standard they can’t follow without unwinding themselves, and take what’s already swimming there. That’s not where brands drown. That’s where they win.

Selected Sources

  • Kim, W. Chan, and Renée Mauborgne. Blue Ocean Strategy. Harvard Business Review Press, 2005 (built on “Value Innovation,” MIT Sloan Management Review, 1997). Official case materials for Cirque du Soleil, Curves, and Yellow Tail (Casella Wines) are published at blueoceanstrategy.com.
  • Golder, Peter N., and Gerard J. Tellis. “Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing Legend?” Journal of Marketing Research, 1993 (the 47% pioneer-failure, 10% vs 28% share, and median 5-year-leadership figures).
  • Tellis, Gerard J., and Peter N. Golder. Will and Vision: How Latecomers Grow to Dominate Markets. 2001.
  • Academic critique of Blue Ocean (selection bias, lack of theoretical corpus, “magic-bullet single solution,” “what not how,” “value innovation = hybrid value”): see the management-fashion analysis in Social Sciences (MDPI, 2019) and associated reviews.
  • Hilb, Michael, and Casas (2015): characterized Blue Ocean as a “popular non-scholarly concept.”
  • Kociatkiewicz, Jerzy, and Monika Kostera (2016): faulted Blue Ocean for lacking theoretical coherence.
  • Aspara, Jaakko, et al. (2008): noted the absence of a genuine scientific theoretical corpus.
  • Tassabehji, Rana, and Isherwood (2014): identified Blue Ocean’s selection bias, success stories read in retrospect.
  • Dixit (2014): dismissed Blue Ocean as a “magic-bullet single solution.”
  • Mol, Michael J., et al. (2017): reduced Blue Ocean to a “single-factor explanation.”
  • Kampa, Cziulik, and Amodio (2012): found no clear link between formulating and implementing a Blue Ocean.
  • Agnihotri (2016): showed value innovation predates Blue Ocean under the earlier term “hybrid value.”
  • Roberto, Michael. “Curves: Not Such a Blue Ocean After All” (Porter’s five forces overwhelming the strategy; the Warren Buffett “reputation of the business” line). Curves franchise figures: peak of 7,877 US locations (2005) to roughly 3,523 (2011); Chapter 11 filing, 2020.
  • Cirque du Soleil bankruptcy protection, 2020.
  • Casella / Yellow Tail financials: first loss in ~13 years (~$5.5M), US sales down ~17%, debt-covenant breach and waiver (recent reporting, 2025).
  • Liquid Death: $1.4B valuation and ~$333M revenue (2024), 130,000+ retail locations; founder Mike Cessario.
  • Rogers, Everett. Diffusion of Innovations. 1962. Moore, Geoffrey. Crossing the Chasm. 1991.
  • Ries, Al, and Jack Trout. Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind, 1981, and The 22 Immutable Laws of Marketing, 1993.
  • Porter, Michael. Competitive Strategy, 1980.
  • Buzzell, Robert, and Bradley Gale. The PIMS Principles, 1987.

Fast-Track De-Positioning Masterclass – FREE With Book Purchase

To celebrate publication of the First Edition of my book, I’m hosting a live Fast-Track De-Positioning Masterclass to help you apply the framework immediately.

When you purchase the First Edition of my book here (personally signed to you), your seat in the Masterclass is included at no cost.

What this session is

  • 90-minute live intensive implementation session
  • Direct walkthrough of the De-Positioning Matrix®
  • Practical guidance for applying it to your business

What this session is not

  • Not recorded
  • No replays
  • Not a sales webinar – an intensive training Masterclass

Format

Live on Zoom
NEXT MASTERCLASS: TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2026 AT 8 AM PACIFIC TIME

Masterclass registration without book purchase: $1,250

Included with book purchase: FREE

Full details and registration link are sent by email after book purchase.